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This work is about the co-evolution of intra-organizational networks and 
organizational structures and behaviors, in the context of the introduction of an innovation. 
A number of network studies, especially those concerned with the role of social capital in 
organizational settings, has focused on those actors who are most important in shaping the 
structural features of the network. We focus on one such actors, the broker, that is the one 
whose ties connect otherwise disconnected sets of network nodes. Our aim is assessing the 
mechanisms through which the broker legitimizes himself in his own role. In fact, existing 
studies mainly document the consequences of the broker network position, but do not analyze 
the mechanisms through which this position is acquired vis a vis the other actors in the 
network. 
In this work we address both the organizational and the individual levels of analysis. At the 
organizational level we analyze the evolution of intra-organizational networks in the context 
of an important organizational change. At the individual level we analyze how personal 
attributes and behaviors co-evolve with the networks, as a consequence of the actors learning 
processes. We will focus on one specific network member who is shown to improve his own 
understanding of how to perform the informal role of the broker. We will see that such 
informal role will be turned into a formal organizational position by the end of the period 
observed in this study. 
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Who is the broker? 
A number of organizational researchers adopted a network perspective and addressed 
issues related to the unfolding, development and reproduction of organizational networks. 
According to this perspective, social structure can be defined as a general configuration of 
relations that unfolds from the routine dyadic interactions of actors who enact specific roles 
(Boissevain and Mitchell, 1973; Burt, 1980, 1982). Social structural change emerges from 
these dyadic interactions, while actors’ behaviors are better understood as related to their 
location within social structure. The role an actor performs may depend on his competences, 
and he may exploits his role and competences in order to enhance his own visibility and 
attractiveness for other actors. At the same time, easy recognition of the competences of an 
actor reduces the search costs of other actors, and by consequence increases their interest in 
crediting him a specific role and in connecting to him in such a way that endows him of a 
specific location in social structure. Some researchers  (Walker, Kogut & Shan, 1997; Gulati 
& Gargiulo, 1999) stated that past ties somehow are the basis for future ties and the network 
evolves on persistence of  structure factors. In this sense persistence is a “structural property” 
(Giddens, 1984) by which interactions are reproduced over time and across actors. 
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Burt (1992) introduced the concept of broker, defined as the actor that benefits from 
bridging a structural hole in the network. A structural hole is defined in terms of the absence 
of ties among actors in a network, and the broker is the actor through whom otherwise 
disconnected actors are indirectly connected. Actors that fill structural holes enjoy 
information and control benefits. Information benefits in particular arise from access to more 
heterogeneous sources of knowledge; not every actor is equally well placed to fulfill this 
knowledge broker role, as different network positions offer different opportunities for 
individuals to access a variety of knowledge sources (Burt, 1992; Tsai, 2001; Rodan & 
Galunic, 2004; Ahuja, 2000a). Such knowledge brokers are central employees that act as a 
link-pin between two or more employees and make the transfer of knowledge possible (Ibarra 
& Andrews, 1993; Fleming & Waguespack, 2007). 
Pollock, Porac and Wade (2004) introduced the concept of the “architect” broker, in 
order to explain the determinants of the strategic choices undertaken for building and 
managing networks in the context of a competitive business. Pollock et al. state that, in 
building his business network, the broker tends to prefer long or short-term strategies 
according to the amount of social resources possessed, the degree of dependence on the 
specific business as a source of profits, and other exogenous conditions. The more the social 
resources possessed, the more flexible tends to be the construction and the management of 
the network. The larger the dependence for profits from a specific business, the more the 
network is built by balancing short and long run considerations.  
We intend to contribute to the study of the evolution of networks as defined by 
Doreian and Stokman (1994) through the longitudinal study of a case of technological 
implementation. According to these two authors, in fact, a substantial difference exists 
between dynamic and evolutionary studies of a network. The first focus on the qualitative or 
quantitative characterization of change or stability, sequentially, simultaneity or ciclicity of 
the phenomenon under study (Monge and Dalman, 1996). Goal of the dynamic approach is, 
therefore, that of providing a sophisticated description of the changes that took place in the 
network. On the contrary, the evolutionary approach follows the further end of understanding 
the mechanisms that determine the change across time. In particular, we regard the broker 
network position as interactively emergent both from the strategic behavior of the broker, and 
also from him being granted of such role by the other network actors. Recent study  (Soda & 
Zaheer, 2008) has demonstrated that high-performing network actors may be better 
positioned to create superior network structures for themselves which in turn perpetuate 
superior performance. We try to point out the characteristics an actor must possess in order to 
credit himself as a broker in an informal network, by focusing on a specific member of the 
network we analyze. 
This study addresses both the organizational and the individual levels of analysis, in 
that the broker’s attributes and strategies will be assessed in the context of the structural 
changes that occur at the organizational level. We will show that ownership of specific 
technological competences and endowment of the legitimacy associated to a formal 
organizational position, are not sufficient conditions for an actor to acquire/be-granted-of a 
broker role. This depends also on the amount of relational capital accumulated through past 
interactions, and on the network capabilities he possesses. 
 
Relational capital, human capital and network capabilities 
Relational or social capital is composed of two main social resources: the reputation 
of reliability and competence an actor is endowed with (Burt, 2000, Bejamin and Poldolny, 
1999; Bromiley, 1993), and the acquaintanceship or familiarity with other actors gained 
through past interactions (Granovetter, 1985; Larson, 1992; Uzzi, 1996).  
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Social capital has been defined also in terms of a cognitive perspective, as associated 
to similarities in actors’ cognitive schemes and systems of meanings (Nahapiet & 
Goshal,1998). In fact, actors need to invest in reciprocal learning and understanding, in order 
to be able to communicate effectively with others who possess different languages (broadly 
defined) and systems of meanings. It is worth noting that this investment creates an asset, 
because it enables an actor to access information and social resources that otherwise would be 
out of reach. 
Bourdieu and Wacquant define social capital as “‘the sum of the resources, actual or 
virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of 
more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition’” 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, page 119). Social capital carries potential value because it 
provides to actors an opportunity to access information and resources in their social network. 
According to Burt (2000) social capital is linked to the opportunities an actor is given by his 
position in the network: “…social structure is a kind of social capital that can create for 
certain individuals or groups a competitive advantage in pursuing their ends. Better 
connecting people enjoy higher returns.” (Burt, 2000; 2003.) In this sense the broker  has 
access to more social capital the more structural holes he constructs and manages and, in turn, 
he can re-configure profitable social structure of future network . Thus, the more social 
capital an actor possesses, the more likely he is to benefit from the value of his own “human 
capital”. High network centrality frees the actor from dependence on a specific source of 
support and enables him to access to a wider range of resources. Further, to the extent to 
which the actor mediates the indirect contact among otherwise disconnected actors, he enjoys 
the (information and control) benefits of the brokerage position. 
Bourdieu (1980) and Coleman (1990) assert that a network tends to reproduce itself 
on the heritage of past relations and therefore, it follows, on the ability of individuals to 
preserve their own social capital. If this is the case, social capital accrues to an individual not 
only by holding an organizational position that enables him to trigger network contacts both 
within and outside the organization, but mainly through the reputation and legitimacy 
inherited from his relational history. Several authors have associated a central network 
position with greater power. Cook and Emerson (1978) hold power to be an attribute of an 
actor network position, which can be recognized to affect an actor’s behaviours even though 
he is not aware of neither his network position or associated power. According to this 
approach, centrality generates power as a function of greater access to information and, more 
general, by enhancing decision making autonomy.  
Social capital is counterpart to “human capital”. Coleman (1988) defines human 
capital as the sum of competences and capabilities that characterize a person. Burt (1992) 
states that human capital is connected to individual capabilities. Ibarra (1993), in a study of 
the determinants of innovative roles, states that personal attributes like experience, seniority 
and level of education, are important sources of power that affect the possibility of 
undertaking an innovation. Related in particular to the implementation of technological 
innovations, is the fact that individual attributes may translate into greater ease in accessing 
to social resources. Zenger and Lawrence (1989) believe that seniority can substitute formal 
role, in that it fosters the presumption that an actor is legitimated by the organization and 
knows how to manage his own way within it. 
Human capital is a basic requisite of the broker in order to secure organizational 
legitimacy; in turn, human capital and organizational legitimacy together allow him to be 
trusted by other network actors and keep a central network position. Among the components 
of human capital that we believe important in this respect are the abilities of listening to 
others and problem solving, helpfulness and communicative skills. Equally important are 
network capabilities, that could be broadly described as the ability to identify valuable 
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opportunities inside the network, and to exploit them by leveraging ties with other actors. To 
give an example, finding the person who possesses a specific piece of knowledge is often 
difficult within a multi-unit organization (Szulanski, 2003; Hansen, 1999; Hansen & Haas, 
2001); such ability is not common among members of an organization, but can be found in 
those very skilled managers who achieve the fastest careers; “managers with networks rich in 
structural holes tend to be promoted faster and they tend to reach their current rank earlier” 
(Burt, 1992). 
We may summarize this discussion in the following proposition (1): An actor holds a 
broker network position in part as an outcome of his own strategic behaviour, but also as the 
effect of that actor being endowed of such role by the other actors. The chances of the broker 
to legitimate himself in such role are positively related to (i) the social resources inherited by 
past interactions and (ii) to his own personal competences and networking capabilities. 
 
Specific competences and organizational legitimacy 
Ibarra (1993) states that holding a formal organizational position (which is usually 
associated to holding power and responsibility, and access to a number of resources) is an 
indicator of the actor’s network centrality in the implementation of an innovation. In a similar 
fashion, Baldridge and Burnham (1975) maintain that the higher is the hierarchical rank of 
organizational members, the more likely they are to be successful as innovators. Often 
however, actors who hold a formal organizational position but are marginal to informal 
interactions do not play a significant role in promoting the innovation. 
Formal position endows an actor with organizational legitimacy, and especially in 
highly formalized contexts this legitimacy is clearly important in orienting interactions and 
communication processes. It goes without saying, for instance, that in order to deal with a 
reporting problem about a specific organizational unit, one would not turn to an external 
collaborator or a “stageur” for asking clarifications and additional information, even if he 
knew that it is the latter that looks after this on informal grounds. In part then, 
communications and interactions among organization members are dictated by formal 
organizational structure. 
However, even though formal organizational design is decided in order to cope with 
day-by-day organizational activities, it is drawn in advance of their actual performance and, 
to a greater or lesser extent, it has to be adapted in an ad-hoc fashion to the actual flow of 
events and activities. This is even more true in the context of the organizational changes 
usually implied by the introduction of important innovations, when it is harder to then usual 
to assess which organizational design will fit best new and partly unknown activities. 
Informal organizational networks reflect the ad-hoc arrangements and solutions that always 
are needed to complement, and sometimes substitute, formal organizational design. Informal 
networks provide insight into the general ways “things are getting done” within the 
organization, often bypassing and sometimes undermining formal communication processes. 
Informal networks are credited of providing faster information flows, and of allowing 
knowledge and information to flow in both vertical and horizontal fashions, which increases 
the overall flexibility of the organization (Cross et Al, 2002).  
A degree of organizational legitimacy, at least that implied by formal organizational 
membership, is usually needed for an actor to be regarded as a legitimated participant to 
organizational interactions and communication processes. At times however, and we will 
show this to be the case of this study, informal status can even substitute organizational 
membership as a base for participating to organizational interactions and communications. In 
other words, the informal the status an actor is given by past collaborations with 
organizational members, that endow him with their trust and with a positive reputation of 
problem solving capabilities, can make of him a member de facto of the collective effort 
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undertaken within the organization, even despite the lack of any organizational affiliation. In 
fact, Krackardt (1992) points out holds that two people who do not know each other may 
develop reciprocal trust in part as a consequence of both trusting the same third person. 
Shared trust in a third party is therefore seen as a proxy of mutual. Thus, the role of one such 
actor can be expected to translate into a central, and possibly a brokerage position in the 
informal network mainly composed of organizational members. 
To summarize we state our last proposition (2): Informal status is a sufficient 
condition for endowing an actor with a key (broker) position within an organizational 
network. 
 
Data and Methods 
Empirical setting 
The empirical context of this research is a small Italian university with about 10,000 
students, 2,550 employees and approximately 500 teaching staff members, including both 
permanently-employed and on-contract professors, in the academic year 2003/2004. In this as 
in the other Italian universities, the introduction in 1999 of a new law by the Italian 
Government raised the problem of the restructuring of teaching activities, with a substantial 
increase of the number of educational paths offered. In this context the governing bodies of 
the university started a number of administrative, organizational and technological 
innovations. We focus on one such technological innovations, the introduction of a new 
information system, that had also broad administrative and organizational consequences.  
We analyze the organizational network composed of the persons involved in the 
project of development and implementation of the new information system. The project 
consisted of three distinct phases. The first lasted about eight months and ended on October 
14th, 2002, with the presentation of the basic design of the system. This first phase involved 
14 actors that were formally designated among members of several organizational units: 
faculties, information technology centre and students secretariat. In the performance of their 
activities, the 14 officially designated project members activated further contacts. The actors 
that on the whole have contributed to the development of the phase have been 37. 
During the first phase the original objectives were redefined and the scope of the new 
information system broadened. While originally the main goal was the optimization of the 
spaces for the didactic activity, soon it became clear that the new system could be exploited 
also for further ends. These were identified in the following: restructuring the information 
system that supported didactic activities in general; providing information for supporting 
decision making at different organizational levels, including broad strategic decisions; 
decreasing administrative costs without affecting the quality of services. 
These new directions of the project were further elaborated and  refined during the 
second and longest phase of the project, aimed at the set up of the data archives needed by the 
system, and its experimentation. The second phase begun right after the end of the first and 
was ended 16 months later, on March 14th 2004. In this phase, the original group of official 
project participants was enlarged to 25 people, who activated further informal contacts for a 
total of 41 actors involved. The majority of them had also participated to the first phase.  
The third and last phase begun with the deliberation of the Academic Senate on 
February 12th, 2004 which approved regulations concerning the scheduling, organization and 
performance of didactic activities. This triggered the process of actual implementation of the 
information system in all the faculties, and started the redaction of a further document 
concerned with the redefinition of administrative procedures and restructuring of several 
organizational processes, and with the allocation of functions and responsibilities. The third 
phase officially involved 31 people, who activated further contacts for a total of 45 actors 
involved. 
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Data collection and coding 
Data were collected by participant observation, interviews, and through submission of 
sociometric questionnaires, across all three phases of the project. None of the authors of the 
present paper participated directly to the activities observed, however one of project 
participants has been involved in the first stages of the research and contributed, together 
with the first author, to the redaction of a first draft of the present paper. For each phase all 
the persons who were actually involved in the project were identified; the names of those 
participants who were not officially designated were elicited from official participants. For 
each of the three phases a sociometric questionnaire was submitted to all the actors involved 
in the project (whether formally or not).  
The questionnaire presented a list of all the persons involved in each phase and asked 
with whom among them the interviewee had interacted with (without distinction among face 
to face, phone or e-mail contact) for discussing issues related to the project. The 
questionnaire asked to specify separately the interactions related to four distinct types of 
issues (two categories related to administrative and organizational subjects - a. organizational 
and procedural, and b. related to regulations- and two concerned with technical subjects -c. 
technical constraints and d. related to technology operation), and to specify for each the 
frequency of contact. At the same time the questionnaire was submitted to each actor, an 
interview was conducted in order to further explore and clarify salient facts that the 
participant researcher had noticed. The results of the questionnaire and the interviews were 
coded and analyzed by a researcher who was not involved in any of the project activities. 
 
Methods 
We built distinct relational matrices for each project phase and content of interaction 
(type of issue discussed), by coding the frequency of contact each person reported with any 
other. We analyze the three relational matrices (networks), one per project phase, obtained by 
conflating the four relational contents into a single one through a union operation. Interaction 
was coded as present or absent, without distinction of frequency. In other words i sends a tie 
to j in the network observed for a given phase of the project, if i reported that during that 
phase he discussed with j (at least once in a semester) about at least one of the four general 
topics. 
We first present a description of the networks based on graphical representations and 
on structural indices at both the network and individual actors levels. We then report 
qualitative evidences that emerged from the interviews of the network members and from 
direct observation of the project activities, and conclude by presenting the estimation of 
stochastic models of the evolution of the network across the three phases. 
 
Network descriptive 
We report graphical representations of the network in each phase. This is effective 
and intuitive for describing general structural features, but implies an ambiguity because 
which structural features are made evident depends on the geometrical location of the nodes 
in the picture. Layout algorithms,  that compute the set of nodes’ coordinates that best fits a 
number of criteria, overcome this arbitrariness and help reveal the structure of the network. 
There may not exist a unique set of coordinates which is optimal according to the criteria to 
be matched, and the iterative nature of the layout algorithms implies that the locations of 
nodes vary on repeated runs of the layout algorithm. The layouts of the pictures presented 
were found to be very stable on repeated runs in their general appearance, changes from run 
to run consisted at most in very small adjustments or in the rotation of the most central part of 
the network.. The software we used is NetDraw (Borgatti, 2002). 
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We used the most common layout criterion, that might be roughly described as that of 
making the geometrical distance in the picture among two nodes proportional to their graph 
theoretic distance, that is the minimum number of lines that should be crossed in order to 
move ideally from one node to the other across the network ties. One implication of the graph 
theoretic distance criterion is that the nodes that are best connected tend to be located at the 
centre of the picture.How well a node is connected in the network may be assessed in 
different ways, in fact many node level centrality indexes exist that grasp different aspects. 
We will discuss a few of these below, however this distinction, though very important, does 
not greatly affect the layout of nodes in graphical representations 
For each phase we also computed indices at both the network and the individual 
actors levels. At the network level, density expresses the extent to which actors interact with 
each other, and is computed as the ratio of the number of ties to its maximum possible 
value263. Network centralization expresses how interaction is distributed among network 
actors, and measures the extent to which a few actors are very well connected (high 
centrality) while a majority is marginal (low centrality). While this is true in general, 
centralization is computed on the base of node level centrality scores, it is then contingent 
upon the specification of the node level centrality index. The centralization index is computed 
by summing the differences between the greatest observed centrality and all centrality scores, 
and taking the ratio of this sum to its maximum possible value. 
We will compute two types of node level centrality indexes (and associated network 
level centralizations) (Freeman, 1979). An actor degree centrality is the number of others he 
interacts with in the network; if a distinction is made between tie sender and receiver, degree 
centrality splits in outdegree (number of others an actor sends a tie to) and indegree (number 
of others an actor receives a tie from). Betweenness centrality measures the extent to which 
an actor is located over the shortest chains of contacts (geodesics) that connect other actors. It 
is then a measure of how important is an actor as broker of the (indirect) contact among 
others, or in other words a measure of the extent to which an actor fills the gaps (structural 
holes) due to the lack of ties among other actors. 
While any network tie may affect the betweenness score of an actor, the constraint 
index (Burt, 1992) focuses on his network neighborhood, his ego-network. The ego network 
of a given focal actor (ego) is composed of the other actors he is connected to and the ties 
among them. The constraint index is a measure of the extent to which the network contacts of 
the focal actor are tied to each other, and is inversely related to the presence of structural 
holes in his network neighbourhood. 
 
Evolution of the network 
Interviews with actors of the project network focused on motives orienting individual 
choices of partners of interaction. Somewhat in a similar fashion, the stochastic models of 
network evolution that we present are based on the estimation and testing of the actors 
structure of preferences, which directs their choices of the contacts to send a new tie to or 
withdraw an old tie from. 
We model the evolution of the network across the three phases based on these actor-
oriented models of network change (Snijders 2005a, 2005b, 1996). These simulation based 
models allow estimation and testing of parameters associated with the dynamical tendencies 
of the network. We will estimate structural effects which quantify the general tendency of the 
actors to reciprocate ties (reciprocity) and their tendency to cluster in internally dense 
network subgroups (transitive closure). We will then add to the model the interactions that 
                                                          
263 This is n(n-1) in a network that includes n actors, if a distinction is made among the tie from actor i to actor j 
and that from j to i. 
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capture the differential between the general network dynamics and the evolution of the ties 
that involve a specific network actor, the broker.  
Figure 1- Interactions among project participants - Phase 1 
(Boxes = formally designated project members) 
 
 
Transitive closure is exemplified in Figure 2; this structural tendency implies the 
dashed tie shown in the right side to directly connects the two nodes only indirectly 
connected in the left side. The stronger the tendency to transitive closure, the more the 
network is articulated in subgroups whose members are all tied each other, while no ties exist 
between members of different groups. In terms of the ego networks of Figure 1, perfect 
transitive closure would imply that all network contacts of a given node are directly tied each 
other, with absence of structural holes, null betweenness and high constraint scores for the 
focal actor. 
Figure 2- Interactions among project participants - Phase 2 
(Boxes = formally designated project members) 
 





We will add to the first results by focusing on the key actors of the network, and 
reporting evidences from interviews with network participants and direct observation. Here, 
in order to give empirical content to the concept of network capabilities, we focus on key 
statements and concepts collected during the interviews. In particular, we maintain that an 
actor recurrently reported as accessible, helpful, effective at problem solving, at activating the 
right contacts for accessing valuable information, at coordinating collective efforts is 
endowed with network capabilities. 
 
Results 
Figures 1 to 3 show the network in each of the project phases. A quick look at all 
three figures shows an increase of network density from phase 1 to 3. The network densities 
were 7.6%, 14.8% and 16.1% in phase 1 through 3 respectively. The remarkable 
centralization of the network is better appreciated in Figure 3 for phase 1, when the network 
is sparser; the increase of density in later phases tends to obscure network centralization in 
Figures 4 and 5, however centralization indexes show it increases from 35% to 53% for both 
in and out-degrees, and from 12% to 21% for betweenness. 
Both the official project leader Responsabile_progetto, and the informal one Broker, 
are in the central - densest part of the graph in all three phases. Other actors who play a major 
role in the network tend to vary somewhat from phase to phase. This is confirmed by the 
centrality indexes. In all three phases Broker is most central to the network, and his ego-
network is richest in structural holes. Indeed Broker’s constraint score is always the lowest, 
which indicates he mediates the contact among other actors in his network neighbourhood. 
He performs the same role also for the entire network, as shown by the fact that his 
betweenness is always highest. Broker is reported to be partner of interactions by 15 actors 
already in phase 1 (in-degree), and reports the same number of network contacts; next highest 
on in-degree is Responsabile_progetto (in-degree = 14) and others follow at some distance. 
Figure 3 - Interactions among project participants - Phase 3 
(Boxes = formally designated project members) 
 
Responsabile_progetto, whose network weight is closest to broker in phase 1, loses 
some importance in later project phases. Worthy of note in phase 1 is the case of some actors 
who seem to bridge structural holes in their network neighborhood (low constraint) while do 
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not play the same role in the network as a whole, as testified by their null scores on 
betweenness. This depends on the fact that they are not reported as partners of interaction by 
any other actor in the network (in-degree = 0), that is no tie is directed toward them. It 
follows that they are not located on any chain of contacts that indirectly connect other actors, 
since these chains in a directed network  must involve ties with concordant orientation. 
Guido, who is peripheral in phase 1, gains a prominent role in phase 2 (Figure 2), while 
Antonello enters the network in phase 3 in a very central position (Figure 3). Nobody 
however equals Broker, who quickly increases his importance in the network, as shown by 
the improvement of all network indices across the three phases.  
Table 4 documents some structural tendencies that characterize the evolution of the 
network across the three phases. Parameters estimates 1 and 2 measure simply the amount of 
network change in period 1 (phase 1-2) and period 2 (phase 2-3). Parameters 3 and 4 are 
included in order to account for the distribution of actors out-degrees while assessing more 
complex structural effects. All four effects do not deserve further comments. 
Reciprocity (5) shows a significant tendency for the reporting of interactions to be 
reciprocated by actors on both sides. Next three effects (6, 7 and 8) express in slightly 
different ways the structural tendency to transitive closure, of the greatest importance in the 
study of networks. This is the tendency of actors to cluster in densely knit and mutually 
exclusive subgroups, and of structural holes to disappear from the network. It can be noted 
that this tendency exists in the network as a whole, as shown by the positive and significant 
estimates of parameters 6 and 7. 
Estimates 9 through 12 are dummies that control for some actor level characteristics. 
It is shown some evidence that administrative employees, one of the three job categories we 
distinguished, were more reluctant at participating to interactions than IT technicians (these 
were the reference category; Academics, the third category, did not show any significant 
effect on any model and the effect was not included in the models we are reporting). Estimate 
11 shows that official members of the innovation project were preferred target of interactions, 
while estimate 12 shows they did not initiated interactions more often that average (effect not 
significant). 
Table 4 
Model of project network evolution – Phases 1-3 
(* significant at .05 level) 
1. constant network rate (period 1) 35.74* (8.12) 44.12 (23.15) 44.33* (13.60) 44.22* (12.64)
2. constant network rate (period 2) 16.37* (2.04) 17.87* (2.55) 18.23* (3.11) 18.23* (2.76)
3. outdegree (density) -1.38* (0.21) -1.78* (0.28) -1.81* (0.28) -1.85* (0.23)
4. 1/(outdegrees + 1) 6.04* (0.74) 5.34* (0.68) 5.24* (0.73) 5.19* (0.62)
5. reciprocity 1.42* (0.16) 1.59* (0.15) 1.58* (0.15) 1.58* (0.14)
6. transitive triplets 0.04* (0.01) 0.04* (0.01) 0.04* (0.01) 0.04* (0.01)
7. (direct and indirect) ties 0.33 (0.19) 0.60* (0.26) 0.62* (0.23) 0.66* (0.23)
8. balance -0.27 (0.30) -0.23 (0.33) -0.11 (0.36) -0.03 (0.35)
9. Employees ego -0.22* (0.11) -0.16 (0.10) -0.16 (0.10) -0.15 (0.12)
10. Employees identity 0.08 (0.13) 0.19 (0.13) 0.20 (0.14) 0.21 (0.13)
11. Project alter 0.27* (0.08) 0.23* (0.09) 0.22* (0.09) 0.21* (0.09)
12. Project ego -0.07 (0.09) -0.01 (0.12) 0.00 (0.10) 0.01 (0.09)
13. int. Broker ego × reciprocity 13.321 (fixed) 13.321 (fixed) 13.321 (fixed)
14. int. Broker ego × transitive triplets 0.0761 (0.06)
15. int. Broker ego × (direct and indirect) ties 0.7743 (0.45)
16. int. Broker ego × balance -0.89* (0.36)
controls model 1 model 2 model 3
 




Next are presented the effects that isolate the specific contribution to network 
transitive closure of the ties sent by Broker; these are interactions among the dummy for this 
actor and effects 5, 6, 7 and 8. Interaction with reciprocity was included as a control, but it 
gave estimation problems; since it was shown to be large in many estimates, it was fixed at a 
large value in order to assess effects 14, 15 and 16. These show that the tendency toward 
network closure that holds for the network does not hold for Broker: interactions of this actor 
are not bounded within cohesive subgroups, as shown by the positive and significant estimate 
of effect 16 (and the near significant effect 15). 
How happens that Broker, nor a member of the project or employed at the University, 
was found in such a key network location since the beginning? Did this depend on 
organizational legitimacy, like being designated as coordinator, this location would have been 
occupied by Responsabile_progetto. At least, in order to take a de facto coordinating role 
Broker had to be already familiar to and trusted by other actors, and endowed with some 
other kind of legitimacy. We hold the present case shows that Broker establishes and extends 
his own role incrementally, by exploiting and developing further the social resources he was 
already endowed with. 
Interviews shed some light over this somewhat anomalous circumstance. Actors were 
asked about the motives of their first interaction with Broker. It is quite evident from the 
interviews that Broker, though relatively young, had a positive reputation because he was 
found reliable and trustworthy in his voluntary active participation in prior projects. Guido 
also tried to take a coordinating role and actively involves in interactions with project 
members; in the second phase he sharply increased his outdegrees (from 0 to 19) and 
indegrees (from 1 to 14). This is interesting to note because he is a direct competitor of 
Broker. Like the latter, Guido didn’t hold a position in the University and wanted to get in. 
He was aware that the innovation project could be an important chance for building a good 
reputation and tried to develop good relations with others. He didn’t succeed, and the reasons 
seems that he didn’t have the same network capabilities, coordinating and  personal skills of 
Broker. 
Other clues can be obtained by looking at the reasons “why one would look for 
organizational or technical support from somebody  who does not belong to the project”. Two 
main types of motivation emerged from the answers, those related to the history and type of 
interaction, that might be labelled “social”, and others more specifically related to 
characteristics of the person, defined as “personal”. Based on all the interviews we 
reconstructed some specific characteristics of Broker, which might be generalized to any 
person who performs a brokerage role in a network like the one we observe. Especially 
recurrent were the ideas of effective problem solving, understanding of the organizational 
system and internal communications, the ability to obtain relevant information by tapping the 
right sources, to leverage the right contacts to get things done. Many stated that the broker 
“… is very resolute and prompt to collaboration in solving problems, and has excellent 
communicative capabilities”, “… can’t imagine how difficult it is to get the information you 
look for … never know who to ask, who could be a reliable source …”.  These are network 
capabilities. 
On the other hand, it is interesting to note the evolution of the role of 
Delegato_didattica, the delegate for teaching operations. This formal role was important for 
coordinating flows of information needed for the implementation of the IT system. The 
university Rector, who understood the growing importance of Broker in the informal 
management of the project but could not formally invest him of this role since he was not 
employed at the university, decided to give full power of managing the project to 
Delegato_didattica. In spite of this, even though he was held a competent and trustworthy 
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person, he was listened to only on normative aspects and didn’t take a leading position. 
Broker kept being identified with the innovation project itself. Even though in the first phase 
he had only little more power of the formal project leader, Responsabile_progetto, his role 
grew from phase to phase until the Responsabile_progetto manager himself decided to turn it 
into a formal position by means of a consulting contract. This changed the formal design of 
the innovation project to match the actual, though informal, system.  
 
Discussion and implications 
Organizational implications of innovation include the simultaneous change of both 
relational and non relational aspects of the organizational roles of the actors. Among the first 
are both formal and informal networks (information exchange, reporting …); among the latter 
are actors objectives and competences. At the same time the innovation process itself is 
affected by existing networks and individual capabilities. It is argued, for instance, that the 
informal communication network is of key importance for  the inter-unit process of 
knowledge transfer (Maurer I., Ebers M., 2006; Cross et al., 2002). The present work is 
consistent with these ideas, but focuses also on the interplay between network and actor 
levels of analysis. 
It is shown how individual characteristics shape informal networks, by looking at how 
personal competences affect the network role of actors that are key to the innovation process. 
While much of the debate about social capital has focused on the translation of this idea in 
network structural terms, this work sheds some light on the processes through which a given 
structural position is acquired. We try to bridge social and human capital by exploring the 
personal capabilities that allow an actor to be a legitimate (though only informally at the 
beginning) occupant of a brokerage network position within an intra-organizational network. 
At the network level it is also shown that the informal network may affect the 
evolution of the formal one, depending on the strategies of the actors. From a managerial 
perspective, this points to a way of improving innovation processes, that always involve the 
interplay of formal and informal roles. In this respect, most effective seems to be the role of 
actors who merge formal legitimacy and informal status, by maintaining non-redundant 
relations in both formal and informal networks. 
While we believe that the implications of this study may be generalized, one 
limitation of this work might be found in the specificity of the Italian university organization 
that served as our empirical setting. The direction of research we pursue in this work, by 
addressing both the effects and the generative mechanisms of intra-organizational networks, 
and the interplay between emergent and projected organizational structures and behaviours, 
may narrow the gap between network studies of organizations and concrete organizational 
practice. This could contribute to the construction of the network theory of organization 
(Salancik, 1995) that is needed to improve the design of organizations. 
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